File served from a request-controlled path
Part of Security, which counts for 30% of the overall score. When this check fires it deducts 15 points from that category, once per scan, no matter how many places it turns up.
What it detects
send_file() or send_from_directory() is given a path built directly from request.args/form/values/json/data, so a traversal payload such as ../../../../etc/passwd controls which file on disk gets returned to the client.
Why it matters
send_file() and send_from_directory() return the contents of whatever path they are given. When that path is built directly from request.args/form/values/json/data, a value like '../../../../etc/passwd' or an absolute path to a config file lets the caller read any file the server process can access, including source code, credentials, and other users' uploaded data.
How to fix it
Never pass a request value straight into send_file()/send_from_directory(). Validate it against an allow-list of known filenames or IDs, or resolve the requested path against a fixed base directory and confirm with os.path.realpath()/Path.resolve() plus a prefix check (or Path.is_relative_to() on Python 3.9+) that the result still lives inside that directory before serving it.
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